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-- Abstract --
The service longevity of complex propulsion systems -- such as tile SSMI! -- can be at risk from
several competing failure modes. Conventional life assessmcnt practice focuses upon the most
severely life-limited feature of a given component, even though there may be other, less severe,
potential failure locations. Primary, secondary, tertiary failure modes, as well as their associated
probabilities, must also be considered. Furthermore, these prob;d3ilities arc functions of
accumulated service time. Thus a component may not ahvavs succtm_b to the most severe, or
even the most probable failure mode.
Propulsion system longevity must be assessed by considering simtlltatwously the actions of, and
interactions among, life-limiting influences. These include, but :Jrc not limited to, high
frequency fatigue (ttFF), low cycle fatigue (I.CI:) and subsequent crack propagation, thermal
and acoustic loadings, and the influence of less-than-ideal nondestructive evaluation (NI)F.).
This paper provides an outline for a probabilistic model for service lilb analysis, and reports on
progress towards its implementation. The work is being performed by l'ratt & Whitney under
NAS8-3690 I.
Introduction and Background
Present fracture mechanics analyses for SSMI! critical struclural components may
underestimate life by assuming the worst-case conditions t() define single wducs of
life-controlling parameters even though these parameters arc subie(:t to statistical variations.
The probability of occurrence for any individual worst-case condition is very low, while that of
a combination of worst-case conditions is infinitesimal. Thesc lift." underestimates can result in
inefficient use of material and/or excessive component weight causing a reduced pay'load
capacity and an increased operations cost. SSMI! life analyses max also overestimate life by the
assumption of greater material/structural capabilities and/or less severe (_perating conditions.
Advancing technology is imposing increasing demands on strtlctl,al analysis methods. The
previously acceptable technique of assuming worst-casc conditions i_ no longer a viablc mcthod
for analyzing SSMF. operating systems. A more accurate life assessment technique is nccdcd
which will account for errors in life cstimates and also provide a tool for statistically assessing
the level of risk created by engineering decisions involved in dclining :_ system dcsign.
The objective of this program is to develop a computer code for performing ['racturc mechanics
calculations which consider distributions of major SSMI! li['c-comrolling paranaeters, rather
than the traditional single-valued, worst-case, estimates.
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Probabilistic Modeling
The Space Shuttle Probabilistic Optimization (?ode, SSPO(7, has a_ its objective estimating the
uncertainty in SSME component cyclic longevity which necessarily results from the engineering
uncertainties in life-controlling parameters. Only by. understanding lhc probabilistic behavior
of these components can realistic mission risk assessments be undertaken.
Among the necessary uncertainties which must bc addressed b_ :_ lWObabilistic simulation are
uncertainties in:
1. Initial material quality (IMQ)
2. Stress analysis variability
3. Crack initiation life (l.ow (Zycle I:atiguc)
4. Nondestructive evaluation (NI)I!)
5. Crack size vs. propagation life (a vs. N)
6. Crack initiation life (lligh (Tyclc l:atigue)
7. Mission severity
The following discussion illustrates how statistical uncertainties can be modeled algorithmically
for four major elements: (i) I.(71: variability; (2) stress variability: (3) NI)I! variability; and
(4) fracture mechanics crack propagation (a vs. N) variability. lhc examples are greatly
simplified for expository purposes, while the actual SSPO(" computer code is necessarily more
complex. The underlying ideas are , however, very similar.
Modeling LCF Probabilistically
First consider that fatigue, cvcn under well-controlled laboratory conditions, is a stochastic
process. That is: even when stress, temperature, loading frequency and stress ratio, are known
"'exactly", the resulting fatigue life displays considerable variaNlily. In an actual component
these, and other, life-controlling parameters are not known exactly. Rather, parameters must
bc described as statistical distributions of possible values, some v.'dt,c_ being more likely than
others. It is conventional statistical practice to describe these effects using some engineering
model for the expected, or mean, behavior plus an error term t(, account for uncertainty in
outcome. As an example, the expected fatigue life. ,'Vr at a given _trcss, s, might be modeled
using a simple inverse relationship between stress and the logarithm _f" life:
log Nf= a+ b(I/s) ill
where a and t_ are s-N model parameters.
The uncertainty is then treated as a normal distribution o[ logarithmic errors, with zero mean,
and some specified variance, cr2 . (The zero mean implies that rhc model is expected to be
correct, on the average.)
The resulting log life wouhl then be:
log a + l/s) + [2]
where r, is the normally distributed uncertainty. The follmving segments of pseudocode
illustrate the implementation of these ideas.
l:or a given stress (and temperature, ...) fatigue life can he modeled algorithmically as follows:
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Pseudocode
PROCEDU RE "I3 FECA I.C"
FOR STRESS = s,
BEGIN:
CALCUI.ATE: expected behavior
log Nt= a+ b(l/s,)
CALCULATE: life model random error
= N(O,¢*;)
CALCULATE: individual life
log Ni = Nt + _.,
N,= 10_'°_)
STORE the ith life, N_, for filrther consideration
END:
Now consider the introduction of an additional systematic uncertainly. Stress is not known
exactly, so it too has an associated -- and of course difleren! -- crror structure. (Some
individuals are uncomfortable with the word "error", and prefer Io _se "uncertainty". In this
discussion we will use both terms interchangeably).
The uncertainty in exactly knowing stress influences the overall unccrla_inty in component life.
The following segment ofpseudocode illustrates how this effect can he modeled mathematically.
Pseudocode
PROCEDU RE "STRESSCA LC"
FOR DESIGN STRESS = .%
BEGIN:
CALCUI.ATE: expected stress
s=s a
CALCIJLATF.: stress random error
= N(0, 9
CALCIJI.ATF.: individual stress
END:
These two examples have been greatly simplified for purposes of explanation, but they illustrate
how the SSPOC code treats both deterministic and random influences in ovcrall component life
uncertainty. The next segment of pseudocode shows how these two elfects (life uncertainty at
a known stress and uncertainty in knowing the slress) can be combined.
Psuedocode
PROCEI)URE "FATIGUE LIFE"
BEGIN:
CALCULATE: individual stress
CA LL PROCEI)U RE "STRESS('A I.(7"
(we now have an individual value of s,)
CALCULATE: life at s,
CALL PROCEDURF. "I.I FF.CA I.("
(returns an individual value of N,)
END:
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So far we've calculated a single fatigue initiation life which has bccn influenced by both stress
and life model uncertainties. After accumulating these initiatim_ cycles and exhausting its
initiation life, the part will now contain a crack of a given size.
Modeling the Inspection Process
After having initiated a crack, a part does not necessarily immediately [hil. Depending on its
design it may survive several subsequent missions. (This is especially true of components
designed using damage-tolerance concepts), l:urthermore, if a component can be inspected
between return-to-service intervals, damaged parts can be removed and replaced, and the overall
system reliability thereby greatly improved. Inspection too is a stochastic process, and the
probability of crack detection (POD) is a function of cracksize (aJ (Thompson and Chimenti,
editors, 1982-1986).
Recent advances in the application of statistical modeling techniques to NonDestructive
Evaluation (NDE) have allowed incorporation of both left- and right-censored observations in
modeling the Probability of I)etection vs cracksize (POl) vs. a) relationship (Annis and Erland,
1987). The log-logistic function is one example ofa POD =f(a)model.
POD = [e a+/1 ln(a)]/[ 1 + e_+/1 In(a)] [3]
For a given cracksize, POD can be modeled as follows:
Pseudocode
PROC EI)U RE "NI)I!CA I.('"
FOR CRACKSIZF. = a,
BEGIN:
CAI_CUI.ATI_: POD,
POD, =f(a 3
INSPE('T: inspect the part
GIiNI!RATE: random P,
END:
t,nilbrmly distributed [0,1]
(X)MI'ARE: individual probability of detection with P+
II: P,< POD+ TIII';N retire part
l!I.Sli return part to service
To summarize to this point, the pseudocode illustrates modeling the behavior of an individual
life-limiting location on a single component: its life to initiate a crack of a given size, and the
result of subsequent inspection. The following discussion continues the theme of stochastic
modeling from l.ow Cycle l:atigue (I.CI;) into the area of" crack propagation. The examples are
again greatly simplified [br expository purposes.
Fracture Mechanics Modeling
(.'rack propagation also, even under well-controlled laboratory conditions, is a stochastic
process. Even when stress, temperature, loading frequency and stress ratio, are known
"exactly", the resulting fracture mechanics (FM) life can display wiriability. As with I.CF, in
an actual component these life-controlling parameters are not known exactly. Again, these
parameters may be described as statistical distributions of possible values, some values being
more likely than others. As a greatly simplified example, the expected stress intensity K at a
given stress, s, might be modeled using a simple relationship between stress and the stress
intensity:
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to= (4T -d) [4]
where a represents crack size.
(Remember that the uncertainty in stress was treatcd as a normal distribution of errors, with
zero mean and some specified variance, a s in thc prcccding (tisct_ssion.)
Now consider the problem of relating stress intensity to fracture mechanics life. Perhaps the
simplest relationship between stress intensity and fracturc mcchanics lifiz is thc Paris equation,
a straight line in the iog(da/dN) vs log(K) plane; that is:
log(da/dN) = bo + b I log(K) [5]
where da/dN is crack growth rate and b0, b_ are model paramctcrs.
Substituting equation [4] into equation [5] results in a simple line;Jr lirst order differential
equation. Separating variables and integrating givcs:
= [aZ0-b,/2)_ _/,,/2)] [6]
where ai= final crack size and a_= initial crack size. (As with I('i modeling, other, more
complicated, models may be required in many cascs.)
This equation then directly relates stress and fracture mcchanics lit_-, i:or a givcn component,
design calculations can arrive at a nominal, or mean, prcdictcd liacturc mcchanics lifc vs.
cracksize curve. Then, given the design stress, parametcrs h0 and/,, c:_n bc dctermined.
Even when stress is known "exactly", as it is in laboratory ctmditions, prcdicted crack
propagation life exhibits some variability, which can bc considered as unccrtainty in the fracture
mechanics life prediction calculation. An analysis and comparison _W'prcdictcd and actual lives
from specimen tests and laboratory component tests may bc used to estimate thc distribution
of Actual/Predicted (observed life divided by calculatcd life) lives. Ihis unccrtainty in AOVRP
can be modeled as a normal distribution of logarithmic errors with mc_n tt and variancc cr2 .
The following pseudocode shows how the individual fracturc mech;inics liFc may be determined.
Remember that the individual stress, s, was previously tbund using "'.'qIRI_SS(?Ai.(2"'. Note also
that the FM life is directly dependent on applicd strcss.
Pseudocode
PROCEDU RE "FM LIFE"
FOR APPLIF.D STRESS = s;
BEGIN:
CALCUI.ATE: expected fracture mechanics lifc
N, = [a}' _,m_ a,(' b,m]/[b0 s^,rt_,I2 (! - h,/2)]
CAI.CUI_ATF.: AOVRP random crror duc to lifi: prediction unccrtainty
AOVRP, = N(u,
CAI.CUI.ATE: individual fracture mechanics lilb
iV,= N,[AOVRP,
END:
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Tying it All Together
So far we've calculated a single fatigue initiation liliz which has been influenced by both stress
and life model uncertainties, the probabilistic outcome of the inspection process, and, assuming
the part was returned to service, the fracture mechanics life dependent on cracksize and stress.
To examine the behavior of an entire population of components, the procedure (initiate a crack,
inspect, return to service) must be repeated many times, but t, sing d_fferent individual errors
each time. For example:
Pseudocode
PROCEI)URE "POPU LATION"
BEGIN:
FOR N = 1 to 10,000
CAI.L PROCEDURE "I_ATIGUI! !+IFl!"
CALL PROCEDURF. "NDF.('AI.(7'
CALL PRO('EDURF. "FM I.I El!"
END:
Each call to "FATIGIJE I.IFE" returns an individual initiation liliz, and stores it for further
statistical analysis; the calls to "NI)ECAI.C" and "l:Ml.llq:." perform a similar function for
inspection results and fracture mechanics life. Therefore procedure "'I'OPULATION " has
stored 10,000 (or whatever number is appropriate) individual component initiation and fracture
lifetimes along with the corresponding inspection outcomes, each having been influenced by the
various modeling uncertainties.
Of course there are many other parameters which can afl'ect a component's cyclic longevity.
The purpose of the forgoing discussion was to illustrate, in admittedly simplistic terms, how
these many interacting life-controlling parameters can be modeled by first considering the
individual contributions to overall uncertainty, and then combining these elemental results in a
statistically correct form.
Again, it is very important not to lose sight of thc goal: to model component lifetime
uncertainty. Without special caution it is easy to become so involved in the potential intricacies
of modeling an individual effect that the overall goal is compronlised.
This paper discusses only tile rudimentary aspects of probabilislic lifiz modeling. Any real
component may have several life-limiting locations, some of which may interact either
simultaneously or sequentially. Intrinsic material quality (microstructural anomalies, poor
weldments, etc.) can also influence system longevity. Although beyond tile scope of this paper,
SSPO(" addresses these and other complex life-controlling effects, and can provide valid
estimates of space shuttle hardware reliability.
Pratt & Whitney has nearly a decade of" experience in probahilistic life assessment for gas
turbine engines. As a result of the Retirement for (?ause program, lilc cycle cost savings of $966
million are projected for the USAF FI00-PW-100/200 engine systems over the period 1986 to
2005 (Itarris, et. al, 1987). Maintenance intervals and risk analyses Ihr the RFC program were
based on simulations using the Probabilistic 1.ifiz Analysis Technique (Watkins & Annis, 1985).
This program will build on P & W experience to develop a stand-alone probabilistic life analysis
computer code, refined and tailored for SSMI! applications. A complete user's manual
including tutorial training sessions at NASA-MSI:( 7 will be provided. Two SSMF. life analysis
test cases using SSPOC will be completed. The software will then be installed at NASA-MSFC;
software installation will be verified by reproducing the SSMI! life :_nalysis test cases results at
NASA-MSFC.
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